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INTERVIEW WITH JOHN SEARLE
Bruce Krajewski
JO H N  S e a r l e  I s a Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
California, Berkeley. He is the author of Speech Acts (1969), The 
Campus War (1971), Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of 
Speech Acts (1979), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
(1983), and Minds, Brains and Science (1984). Also, he edited an 
important collection of essays entitled The Philosophy of Language 
(1971).
Many students of literature know Searle through his “debate” about 
a/the philosophy of language with Jacques Derrida in the journal 
Glyph, a debate which carried over into the New York Review of Books.
Searle came to The University of Iowa in April, 1987 to give a talk 
based on the lectures in Minds, Brains and Science. In those lectures, 
Searle presents his refutation of arguments put forth by proponents 
of artificial intelligence (AI). The following interview was conducted 
during Searle’s visit.
I want to ask you about some things you said in your talk last night about the 
refutation of the “strong” AI people, and about how you made a syllogistic-like 
argument regarding why it is a foolish idea to think that the mind is just a 
computer program. Even though this argument is rather silly, and easily 
refuted, as you say, these people are still receiving large grants, and they have, 
relatively speaking, some political power. Why doesn't the refutation of the 
argument prevent them from carrying on? This raises questions about the 
power of these people, and about why your story of the mind isn't as persuasive 
as theirs, or not persuasive to the “right” people.
I think, in the end, it will be persuasive. I think, in the end, rationality 
prevails. In the short run, there is too much invested in the contrary 
view. There are a lot of careers invested in strong AI, and a lot of 
reputations, and a lot of prestige, and a lot of money, and a lot of
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institutional backing. If you spend thirty years betting on the thesis 
that by creating programs you are creating minds, and somebody 
comes along and refutes that thesis, you’re not going to admit the 
refutation immediately. And what I think happens in all these cases, 
whenever you get a paradigm shift in the sciences, whenever a view 
has been refuted, it really takes time for a new generation of people to 
come in before the effect of the refutation takes hold. So I don’t have 
much trouble with the younger generation of people in AI; I think 
most of them agree with me. They think the correct research program 
for AI is what I call “weak AI.” It’s the older generation that finds it 
harder to admit that. Basically, they will probably never admit it; they 
will simply retire. The way that views triumph in the long run is not 
by getting the establishment to accept the views, but by winning over 
a younger generation that just replaces the older establishment. That’s 
what is likely to happen. Thirty years from now, I doubt that anyone 
will believe in strong AI, but that won’t be because the old guard got 
converted. It will be because they retired or died. That’s how it 
generally works. That’s how Chomsky, for example, won in linguistics. 
It isn’t that he converted the older generation of American structur­
alists; he converted their graduate students. That’s what counts.
That’s why I want to talk about stories, and how persuasive stories are, because 
I thought that was important to your talk last night. It's not so much whether 
the argument is sound or not, but whether you can be persuasive with your 
story.
That’s partly right. It is important to have formulae that are accessible 
to an educated, but largely non-specialist public. The appealing thing 
about the presentation that I made on this issue is the parable of the 
Chinese room.1 That story is something that anybody can understand. 
If I had just presented it in the form of an axiomatic derivation from 
three premises, and suppose I had formalized that in the predicate 
calculus—it would not have had anything like the impact that it did. 
Every freshman can understand the parable of the Chinese room. 
However, the contrary danger is that just as you can get an appealing 
parable that makes the point, so the opposition can equally get slogans 
and formulae that enable them to try to answer your objection or to 
evade the consequences of the argument. In the end, when you come 
to the nitty gritty, it’s the logical power of the argument that prevails, 
but that takes a long time. In intellectual life rationality prevails, but 
it takes a while.
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I’m not especially interested in computers. I love them; I love working 
with them, but the theory of computation doesn’t interest me espe­
cially. I am more interested in AI than I am in computers because I am 
interested in how the mind works. Anything that is relevant to how the 
mind works, any new theory about how the mind works, I find very 
exciting. I got into this debate with strong AI because of my activities 
in cognitive science. I’m a member of the Cognitive Science Program 
in Berkeley. There are people who claim this is the way to do cognitive 
science, by designing computer programs. In fact, there is now a 
rather exciting development in programming called “parallel distrib­
uted processing,” or sometimes called “connectionism,” where you 
have a whole lot of interconnected networks. That’s supposed to give 
us an account of cognition inspired by a certain conception of how the 
brain works. I believe connectionism is much more plausible as a 
model of the brain than the old-fashioned step-by-step linear AI was 
as a model of how the mind works.
Now on this particular issue of the Chinese room, that occurred to 
me quite by accident. I had to give some lectures at Yale, and I didn’t 
know anything about what they were doing, so I bought a book and 
read it on the airplane going to New Haven, and I thought of an 
obvious objection to strong AI. I thought of the Chinese room 
example on United Airlines at 30,000 feet between cocktails and 
dinner.
I thought that because many philosophy departments teach symbolic logic that 
there might have been some easy correspondence between philosophical logic 
and computer programming.
There is, but it’s not my field. I don’t do it. There are actually 
traditional programming languages that basically use the principles of 
formal logic, especially the predicate calculus.
Yd also like to find out how you appropriated the philosophical tradition. You 
seem to be influenced by Austin. You mention him in several places. Stanley 
Cavell is also someone who has been influenced by Austin, and yet you seem to 
have taken completely different paths from Cavell. Cavell is someone who writes 
about films and literature, and he is more likely to be read in the English 
department than you.
Is that right? I suppose so.
What got you interested in computers?
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Cavell has an essay about the difference between modern analytic philosophy 
and what he calls continental philosophy. He sees that there's a definite split. 
There seems to be some sort of animosity or distrust between people who practice 
analytic philosophy and, say, existentialism or phenomenology. Do you see this 
same split, and if  so, why does it exist ?
I don’t really see it in that way. I think it is a kind of vulgarization of 
intellectual life in general, and philosophy in particular, to think that 
the important questions are things like “Whose team is he on? Who’s 
he playing for? What philosophical party does he belong to?” It is an 
outsider’s or a journalist’s view to suppose that there are these 
different philosophical teams, and you play on the analytic team or 
you play for the phenomenology team. But basically 1 do think that’s 
vulgar and journalistic. In my own experience, I find I work on 
problems, and you might be surprised to discover where I get help 
with philosophical problems. Last year, I was invited by Jurgen 
Habermas, who is a professor of philosophy at Frankfurt, to come and 
teach with him in Frankfurt. I went; and Habermas and I and 
Habermas’s colleague, Karl-Otto Apel, taught a seminar, the three of 
us together. The “seminar,” by the way, was not a small group; it had 
about a hundred people. If somebody had told me in the middle of 
this, well, these guys are continental philosophers and you’re an 
analytic philosopher, I would have said, “So what?” I mean, we have 
philosophical problems, and we are working on them.
Now, having said that, I have to add that there are, of course, 
differences in style. A French professor who I liked a lot, who used to 
come to Berkeley, and who I used to talk to a lot, was Michel Foucault. 
I don’t know whether Foucault was a “philosopher” or not, but he 
certainly was fun to talk to. I think he did suffer from the fact that he 
didn’t have the kind of conceptual apparatus as part of his taken-for- 
granted intellectual equipment that he would have had, had we gotten 
hold of him at an earlier age. He used to feel a little—I don’t know 
quite what the right word is—envious almost, that American philos­
ophers could take for granted certain standards of clarity and rigor, 
which, in the intellectual community that he was operating in, he 
couldn’t. I once asked him, “Michel, how come you write such strange 
prose? You don’t have to write like that. You don’t talk like that.” And 
he said that that was really required by the French intellectual 
environment. He once said to me, “If I wrote as clearly as you do, 
people in France wouldn’t take me seriously, because they think that 
if they can understand everything, it must be superficial.” And he 
wasn’t joking. This was a very serious conversation we were having 
about different standards of clarity. I believe that Foucault’s work got
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much clearer as he got older and became more confident in his own 
intellectual distinction.
In response to your question, I would say, of course, there are 
different traditions, styles, ways of doing philosophy. What you will 
find, however, is that the really deep issues in philosophy cut across 
those distinctions. So I am much closer in outlook to Jurgen 
Habermas than I am to Quine, even though Quine and I were 
brought up in the same philosophical tradition. I am closer to 
Foucault, in many ways, than I am to Davidson, even though 
Davidson is a close colleague of mine, and I’ve known him for thirty 
years. So there are traditions and styles, but the deep issues in 
philosophy cut right across those traditions. The deep issues in 
philosophy have to do with such things as the role of truth in 
representation, the role of truth in the analysis of semantics, and that 
issue is neutral between analytic and continental philosophy.
Do you see it as also being some form of political argument to make this 
distinction between the continental and the Anglo-American analytic tradi­
tion? For instance, if  you associate yourself with Habermas, some people would 
automatically assume that you must have Marxist political views. Is the 
philosophy separate from the politics ?
I’ve never been able to take the “Marxism” in the Frankfurt school 
very seriously. By “the Frankfurt School,” I mean the contemporary 
Frankfurt school, primarily Habermas and Apel. You see, in Berkeley, 
and in my upbringing, I knew real Marxists. By the standards of really 
mean Marxists, Habermas and Apel aren’t Marxists. A Marxist, first of 
all, is somebody who wants to kill a very large number of people; and 
basically, Habermas and Apel don’t want to hurt anybody. The sense 
in which they are Marxists is not at all the sense in which, by 
“Marxism,” we mean the revolutionary tradition that goes through 
Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the various forms of revolutionary move­
ments that we know today. What they mean by “Marxism” is, roughly 
speaking, the idea that there are certain categories of economic 
analysis that they find useful in doing philosophy. To put it in one 
sentence: They are just not violent revolutionaries. They’re not even 
close to being any kind of violent revolutionaries.
All of this relates to the issue of clarity and how philosophy is to be written or 
talked about in, say, simple language. You often use phrases in the “Minds, 
Brains and Science” lecture like, “Things are simply this,” or “This point is 
clear and decisive, ” or “This demonstrates an obvious point. ” You like clarity, 
and you think things should be clear. Do you think that this sort of streamlined
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language can do justice to the complex issues that you're dealing with? It seems 
that this is an argument that continental philosophers would make: Because 
things are much more complex, they cannot he put into simple language.
That particular book consists entirely of broadcast lectures for the 
BBC. I had to make the material completely clear to a lay audience. 
But in general there is no reason why complex issues can’t be stated 
clearly. In general, there is a rough law I have discovered, and it is that 
if the author can’t state his view clearly, he doesn’t understand it 
himself. There are a lot of points in philosophy and elsewhere that are 
extremely difficult and complex, and if they’re going to be stated 
precisely, they have to be stated in a way that doesn’t disguise their 
difficulty and complexity. But complexity shouldn’t be confused with 
obscurantism—obscurity for the sake of obscurity, or, worse yet, 
simple self-indulgence. Also, many obscure and complex arguments 
have rather simple consequences. Let me give you an example. 
Godel’s theorem is a very complex proof, but the implications of the 
proof can be stated quite simply. It means there are sentences in 
systems of the Principia Mathematica type which are true but not 
provable within the system. That’s an enormous consequence for the 
philosophy of mathematics. That’s a rather simple consequence, but 
the actual proof that states the derivation is very complex. Complexity 
is one thing and obscurantism another. My fight is not with complex­
ity, but with obscurantism. Now, the other point that I was trying to 
make is that there are a lot of complex issues that have a simple overall 
structure, even though the details are complex. You can often state in 
a way that is accessible to any intelligent person what the overall issue 
is, even though you leave out a lot of the complexity of the detail. 
That’s what I tried to do in Minds, Brains and Science. In addition I 
wanted to try to overcome the fact that many people are intimidated 
by what seems like inaccessible professional expertise. They think they 
can’t argue with AI or cognitive science because they are not experts.
This is a change of topic here about the concept of mind, and how the mind is 
tied to your philosophy of language. It seemed to change for me from reading 
Speech Acts, where you seem to sound a lot like Wittgenstein, and then in the 
book on minds, brains, and science. There are things you say about intention 
that, it seems to me, Wittgenstein would argue about. I  just picked out an 
example from Wittgenstein's writings to get your reaction to it and to find out 
whether you would agree with this or not. Wittgenstein is talking about
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intentions, or internal states, or things that go on in a person's mind, and he 
says:
“I’d like to know what he’s thinking of.” But now ask yourself this—apparently 
irrelevant—question. “Why does what is going on in him, in his mind, interest me 
at all, supposing that something is going on?” (The devil take what’s going on inside 
him!) We judge the motives o f an act by what its author tells us, by the report o f  
eyewitnesses, and by the preceding history.
All of this has to be externalized for it to be real. So how do you see your view 
of the mind either agreeing or disagreeing with this?
I think that, at bottom, I’m probably very much in disagreement with 
the behaviorist strand that you find in Wittgenstein. Now it would be 
too crude to describe Wittgenstein simply as a “behaviorist.” That’s too 
simple but Wittgenstein is constantly anxious to emphasize the public 
character of our mental concepts, what he calls the way in which “an 
‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria.” Remember, that’s 
a quotation from the Investigations. I find all of that suggestive, and 
certainly he’s right in most of his observations, but the thrust of many 
of his observations about the mind seems to me profoundly mislead­
ing. It suggests something that I think he felt, and that a lot of people 
have taken him to suggest, namely, that what’s important about the 
mind is its public, behavioral manifestations, and I think that’s not 
right. Mental phenomena have a first-person ontology. They only 
exist from the point of view of the person whose mental phenomena 
they are, and all mental phenomena, if not conscious, are at least 
potentially conscious. So consciousness, and hence subjectivity, are 
primary to mental phenomena. Wittgenstein, I think, neglects that. 
Now he was reacting against a tradition that tried to make the mind 
something private and mysterious and Cartesian and ineffable. Nat­
urally, he tries to state the case against that as strongly as he can. But 
we have now had fifty years or more of the anti-Cartesian, behaviorist 
tradition, and it’s time to put a halt to it. That is, it’s time to remind 
ourselves that what counts about mental phenomena is that they have 
mental features. They have such features as consciousness, subjectiv­
ity, intentionality, and rationality. And they function causally. Our 
own mental states are accessible to us in a way that they are not 
accessible to other people, and all of these facts have to be integrated 
into our overall scientific worldview. That’s what I was trying to do in 
my book Minds, Brains and Science. I think, though it’s always difficult 
to generalize about Wittgenstein, that the direction of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of mind is, in the end, not the same as the direction of 
mine.
Now, you mentioned Speech Acts. I think, in fact, the direction of 
Speech Acts is also counter to the way Wittgenstein wanted to do the
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philosophy of language. I want a theory, and Wittgenstein was 
anti-theoretical. I think Wittgenstein would have been opposed to 
having a theory of speech acts. He would have said it’s impossible to 
get a general theory of speech acts of the sort that I have. For 
example, I think that you can classify different types of speech acts; 
and Wittgenstein would have said that you can’t do that, because there 
are countless different kinds. For Wittgenstein there is no way to 
classify or taxonomize types of speech acts. So, I think, at bottom, I’m 
opposed to many themes in Wittgenstein, though he has been 
enormously influential in my work.
Wittgenstein is more popular with people who study literature. For instance, 
Gadamer says he has been influenced by Wittgenstein, and many people in 
literary theory study Bakhtin, who says that you really don't have a private 
language. The language that you learn is given to you by society, and that any 
sort of speech act you would make would reflect, say, your social class, for  
instance, or your background, who brought you u p—those sorts of things. So 
that you can never be an individual entity.
If you don’t overstate that point, I think I would agree with most of it. 
That is, I certainly think that language is public, and that we learn it 
in particular social situations, and words have publicly accessible 
meanings, and we speak to each other in a publicly understandable 
vocabulary. But I wouldn’t go the Marxist route and say that then we 
can never transcend our class background. I think that’s rather silly.
One more question about this. One of the people I studied with here is Gerald 
Bruns, and he was upset by people who talked about the mind. He believes that 
the mind is an Enlightenment invention. That it really doesn't exist. People 
invented the mind in order to do analytic philosophy, for instance.
That’s an odd thing to say, because the term “mind” has been around 
long before anybody ever thought of analytic philosophy. Did he 
really think that it was invented by analytic philosophers?
He attributed it to Descartes, and I want to present this quotation by Bruns to 
you, to see what you think of this view, because the notion of the mind causes 
all sorts of problems which we can get around by turning things to the social 
rather than to the mind. Bruns writes:
The way you characterize a given phenomenon determines the way in which you 
will go on to study it. If, for example, you characterize interpretation as a mental 
act, you will be constrained to practice a form of epistemology whether by 
constructing a theory o f interpretation on the model o f a theory o f knowledge or 
by practicing epistemological skepticism. If, however, you characterize interpreta­
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tion as something that goes on in the world, that is, something that human beings 
regularly do under a variety o f complicated circumstances, and to accomplish 
certain things that need to get done, then you will be constrained to study the 
history o f such goings on.
Bruns is trying to characterize interpretation, or how we understand things, as 
a social act or custom rather than a mental process.
I guess I don’t see the mutually exclusive character of the mental and 
the social. It seems to me both are real and interconnected. When you 
interpret something, you have to think about it, but, of course, 
interpretation goes on normally in social communities involving 
exchange of ideas between members of that community. I guess what 
I would want to do is reject the either/or implication, the implication 
that either interpretation is a private mental act, or it’s just a lot of 
public noises. Of course, it’s public and, of course, it has to be an 
expression of thinking. We have inherited from Descartes the illusion 
that there are these two realms, the mental and the physical. But I 
want to say once we recognize mental phenomena as part of the world 
we all live in, then they cease to be terrifying; then they cease to be 
mysterious. We can recognize that things like going on a picnic, or 
teaching a course, or buying a used car, are all both “mental” and 
“physical.” What that tells you is that the terminology was the wrong 
terminology from the beginning. We are slaves to the terminology 
here, and I’m stuck with the terminology as much as anybody else. If 
you use the expression “the mind”—it sounds like you’re naming a 
thing, or an entity, or an arena. But when we use the expression 
“mind” we are in fact just talking about human beings at a certain level 
of operation; and we are talking about certain features that human 
beings have, such as consciousness, that are absolutely crucial for their 
functioning as human beings.
The mind includes things that aren't easily explained, or that can't he explained 
through the physical?
I don’t know why not. What can’t be explained? I don’t think the mind 
is mysterious or ineffable. There are a lot of things we don’t know the 
answers to, but if somebody says you can’t get a theory of the mind, 
they are wrong. I just wrote part of such a theory. I wrote a 250-page 
book (Intentionality) about how the mind works. Of course, I only 
scratched the surface. There’s much much more to be said. The 
problem with the quotation that you gave is not that it’s wrong, but 
that it tacitly accepts the dualism that it attempts to be militating 
against. It accepts the idea that we have to choose between a public 
and a private conception of interpretation. We don’t. Interpretation
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is, of course, a matter of thinking, which is a conscious mental process, 
and, of course, it is also a social phenomenon. The mistake is to think 
that somehow those are in conflict. They are not.
Bruns gets around to the conflict later. The conflict is about whether the mind 
leads you to epistemology, and then you have to have methodologies in order to 
prove how the mind works. Then you get, at least as fa r  as interpretation goes, 
different camps of how you understand a text. You have a Marxist reading, a 
psychoanalytic reading, and a hermeneutic reading. People choose camps, and 
that's where the conflict seems to begin. I  think that's what Bruns was trying to 
get to there. People do choose, and this is somehow wrong, because what they're 
doing is choosing a methodology rather than trying to understand the 
complexity of the problem; it exceeds the methodology.
I’m sure you are right about that. These methods always look 
incredibly superficial when you see them described. Reader-response 
theory, for example, looks very superficial when you see the descrip­
tion of it. Roughly speaking, the method I use in philosophy, or 
anything else, is: use any weapon you can lay your hands on. In the 
middle of the fight, do what you can. When I’m working on the 
philosophy of mind, I don’t say myself, “I’m an analytic philosopher. 
What does an analytic philosopher do?” I go down and buy every 
textbook I can find about the brain, or I go and talk to psychiatrists, 
and find out what they think they’re doing. Use any weapon that you 
can. Some of them will turn out to be useless, and others will be useful. 
But you can’t say in advance what is going to be the right method. The 
proper method to follow in philosophy, or literary criticism, or 
anything else, is to use what works.
Let's turn to the mysterious and ineffable. Acts that aren't really acts are 
difficult to understand, like communicating by doing nothing, or by being
 
silent. I ask you a question, and you just sit there. How am I going to interpret
 
that?
There is a way to answer that. Ask yourself, “Is it intentional or not?” 
To ask yourself that question is to ask yourself whether there is a 
certain kind of intention. For example, if you ask me a question, and 
I decide I’m not going to answer it because I think it’s an insulting or 
a dumb question, and I just sit there, deliberately silent, that silence is 
itself a kind of intentional speech act. Whereas if you ask me a 
question, and I don’t hear you, then my external behavior might be 
the same—I might just sit there silently—but in that case it is not a 
speech act. So the same behavior can be an expression of two
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completely different intentional phenomena. That’s even true when 
the behavior is null, that is, when the physical behavior is simply zero. 
In one case, it might be an intentional non-performance of a speech 
act, which might itself be a type of speech act, and in the other case, 
it might simply be the non-performance of an intentional speech act.
Another question you brought up last night was about how you decide or 
interpret something that seems to be very strange. You were talking about the 
Chinese room, and how your actions could be interpreted as your understand­
ing Chinese. If you keep giving out the right symbols, someone could say this 
person obviously understands Chinese. At least the Greeks called this the 
pseudos, something that looks real or true, but isn't. This interests people in 
literary theory, especially with things like the movie The Return of Martin 
Guerre, in which a man assumes someone elses position, actually takes the 
place of a husband who has disappeared. It is a question of identity, a problem 
of disguise. So where does the identity come from? Is it from within—that you, 
as a person giving out the symbols, know that you don't understand Chinese? 
But what if  you kept this up long enough, and people assumed on the outside 
of the room that you knew Chinese, and then these people wrote books about you 
after you died, saying that you were the greatest understander of Chinese ever. 
Wouldn't you then become a real speaker of Chinese?
Not the way you describe it. Let’s go through the steps of the story. 
Suppose that I’m very well programmed, so that I can continue to give 
the right Chinese symbols as output in response to the right Chinese 
input—only I’m always kept locked in this room, so I can’t ever learn 
the meanings of any of these symbols. Let’s suppose that after my 
death people get excited by my answers to the questions, and they 
discover that they have wonderful stylistic features, and that they 
show a deep grasp of Chinese. They attribute all of that to me. But, if 
so, they have made a mistake. The fact that they all agree on 
something doesn’t make it true. They are still mistaken. The brilliance 
of undertanding Chinese should have been ascribed to the program­
mers who programmed me, and not to me. It’s perfectly possible that 
these mistakes might proliferate, and become generally accepted as 
true, even though they’re just plain false. The way you describe it, it 
would be just plain false to say of me that I understood Chinese. 
There is a kind of bullshit theory that goes around today that says that 
if you get enough people to agree on something that’s all the truth you 
need. That’s obviously wrong, because a lot of things that people 
agree on are just plain false.
But if  you're dead, you can't come back and correct us.
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There are a lot of cases in which the truth may never be known. What 
were Lee Harvey Oswald’s motives? We may never know.
The last thing I  want to ask you about is, now that it's ten years after your 
debate with Derrida, what do you feel the debate accomplished? And do you feel 
the debate is settled?
I never had a debate with Derrida. What happened was that some 
people presented me with an article in French by a French professor 
of philosophy about speech acts and asked me what I thought of it. 
The professor was Derrida, whose work I had never read before, and 
I told them that I didn’t think the article was very good. They asked 
me if I would write down what I thought of it, because they wanted to 
include it in a journal they were starting. I agreed to do that, and over 
a weekend I wrote up my notes. But that’s all I did. It was not a debate; 
I wrote about ten pages in response to his twenty-five page article, and 
then to my total amazement, he produced nearly a hundred pages in 
response to me. If there were going to be a debate, I would want equal 
time. I found his response to be more of a hysterical outburst, a rather 
low-level temper tantrum, than a serious piece of philosophical 
analysis. However, I did later publish a more general piece in the New 
York Review of Books where I tried to give an overall assessment of the 
intellectual level of so-called deconstruction. (See “The Word Turned 
Upside Down,” New York Review of Books, 30 [October 27, 1983].) So, 
we might think of the New York Review piece as part of a “debate,” but 
there never was anything approaching a debate in the original 
sandwich whereby Derrida had a long article, I was allowed a short 
reply, and then without warning or consulting me, the editors 
published a very long reply by him. I was never, by the way, given any 
opportunity or invitation to reply to his piece.
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the whole incident is the 
very low intellectual level of the work of Derrida, in particular, and 
deconstruction, in general. If you think about the things that we have 
been discussing in the course of the interview—artificial intelligence, 
analytic philosophy, Habermas, Foucault, Wittgenstein, or Austin— 
Derrida’s work simply cannot be discussed at that level. The only 
interest that the discussion would have would be to explore the status 
of a certain sort of pathology—the popularity of “deconstruction”—in 
contemporary American intellectual life.
NOTE
1 The parable goes like this: Imagine that a bunch o f computer programmers have 
written a program that will enable a computer to simulate the understanding of
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Chinese. So, for example, if the computer is given a question in Chinese, it will match 
the question against its memory, or data base, and produce appropriate answers to the 
questions in Chinese. Suppose, for the sake o f argument, that the computer’s answers 
are as good as those o f a native Chinese speaker. Now then, does the computer, on the 
basis o f this, understand Chinese? Does it literally understand Chinese in the way that 
Chinese speakers understand Chinese? Searle’s answer is no, and what he does in the 
parable is substitute a human being in a closed room for the computer that seems to 
understand Chinese. If you are the computer and you give the right Chinese answers, 
that is not enough to guarantee that you will understand Chinese.
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